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Abstract
We present a voting scheme that has all of the following properties. Correctness of the results
is openly veriable. No trusted party is needed. Selling of votes is impossible, since there is only
a negligible chance of proving voting strategies. The scheme is ecient enough for a practical
setting. c© 1999 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols have been applied to elections in computer networks quite
successfully, e.g. [1, 3, 7, 9, 6, 10]. All of these voting schemes seem to be even more
secure than traditional manual balloting systems. However, all of them have a severe
drawback which is not present in the traditional system: it is easy to sell votes. This
follows from the fact that you are able to prove your voting strategy to any bystander.
In fact, it is even possible to let other people to cast the vote instead of you.
It is a matter of a political debate to decide the signicance of this problem. We just
give one example of the many arguments given in the discussion. It has been estimated
that political pressure inside families might increase drastically if it would be easy to
control casting of votes by a home computer terminal. Of course, systematic buying
of votes in a large scale constitutes another threat against the democratic principles of
secret elections.
The rst attempts, [2, 8], to solve this problem were made in 1994. The basic idea
of these schemes was the same. Before the elections a preliminary registration phase is
organized. During this phase the voters are physically separated from everybody else,
and zero-knowledge techniques is used to give each voter some private information,
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say s. This s is later needed to cast the actual vote. The desired properties follow,
because the voters are not able to prove to anybody which s they obtained in the
registration.
Although the basic idea is the same, the two schemes use a somewhat dierent
approach. In [2], s is used to decrypt the value of the actual vote. The voter can show
his vote to a possible buyer, but he cannot give any evidence of its value. There is,
however, a slight disadvantage: a voter may allow the buyer to cast a random vote. In
some cases the buyer might be interested to buy such a vote. For instance, if a certain
decision is made only if 75% of the voters say yes, then a random vote clearly favours
the \no-side".
In [8], s is used dierently. The votes are cast as pairs of the form (vote,s). A
vote is valid only if the associated s is of proper form. The voters are allowed to cast
any number of votes, but the idea is that only one valid vote per voter is possible.
It follows that the voter can prove to a buyer the value of her vote, but she cannot
prove the validity of the vote. Because only valid votes are counted, no harm is done
by selling and casting invalid votes. The disadvantage of this protocol is severe: it is
far too impractical for real implementations.
A third receipt-free voting scheme was given in [11]. By using non-interactive zero
knowledge proofs and chameleon blobs it turns out to be possible to avoid the physical
separation of the voter in the registration phase. The assumption of physical separation
is replaced by a milder one: the centre of the voting must have a physically secure
private channel to each voter. However, it is not clear how it is possible to implement
these channels if the voter is not physically separated from potential buyers of her vote
at any stage.
In this paper we develop the idea of [8] to a practical level. All key phases of
the original protocol make use of reductions to massive general-purpose multiparty
protocols of [5]. These inecient reductions are in this paper replaced by special-
purpose solutions tailored for the voting application.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains an informal sketch of our
scheme. In Section 3 we present the central zero-knowledge protocols. A detailed
description of the protocol follows in Section 4, while it is further discussed in the
nal three sections.
2. Idea of the scheme
The main structure of our scheme is similar to that of [8]. On the other hand, the
scheme of this paper is signicantly more ecient.
Denote the voters by Vi (i=1; : : : ; t) and let vi be the vote cast by Vi while [vi] is
the corresponding voting strategy. In traditional voting procedure vi= [vi] and the link
between vi and Vi is cut by scrambling votes in a sealed box. It follows that the voter
cannot prove her voting strategy.
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We imitate some ideas of the traditional manual voting system. All interest groups
(e.g. parties or candidates) participate in the protocol and they are denoted by Cj
(j=1; : : : ; n). We call them candidates for the sake of simplicity.
In the preliminary phase candidates agree on a zero-way permutation f (see the next
section), the values of which can be computed i all candidates co-operate. A public
list of \checking numbers" xi (i=1; : : : ; t) is generated at random. Moreover, candidates
perform a multiparty computation that outputs a list of numbers yi (i=1; : : : ; t) such
that yi’s are f(xi)’s in some order. The order is unknown to everybody, a fact that
is most crucial in preventing chances for selling votes. The numbers yi are publicly
allocated to voters, e.g. yi is given to Vi.
In the registration phase the voter Vi communicates with each candidate Cj using
private channels. The output of this communication is zi=f(yi). Zero-knowledge tech-
niques is used, and while Vi learns the value of zi and its correctness, she cannot prove
these to anybody (except to the full coalition of all candidates). This is another key rea-
son why proving of voting strategy is impossible. The number zi is called an eligibility
token.
The vote of Vi is now vi=E(i1; : : : ; iu) where E is a public-key encryption function
of the candidates, u is the number of possible voting strategies and ik = zi if k corre-
sponds to [vi] while the rest ik ’s are random. The voters cast their votes, possibly (but
not necessarily) anonymously, in the actual voting phase and there is no prevention of
sending false votes.
The counting phase begins by decryption of the votes. For each voting strategy the
associated tokens z01; : : : ; z
0
l are listed. The candidates execute, once again, a multiparty
computation that calculates the numbers f−1(f−1(z0j)). (Each vote, valid or false,
contains one token for each voting strategy.) For each such number it is checked
whether it appears in the public list of \checking numbers" xi. Every match contributes
to the nal tally of the voting. After all possible voting strategies are treated the protocol
is complete.
This was the main idea of our scheme. However, it is somewhat simplied version
of the protocol, as can be seen in Section 4. There we use several dierent zero-way
functions, e.g. f(1); f(2); f(3); gi instead of only one f.
It is important to note that it is possible to execute the registration phase of many
dierent votings at the same visit to the voting booth. Of course, if this would not be
possible, the total benet of a computer voting over a traditional one would be marginal.
3. Zero-way permutations
The main idea in our election scheme is that in the registration phase each voter is
given (in controlled circumstances) an eligibility token, which is then cast inside the
actual vote in the voting phase. The token is constructed so that nobody alone can
check the validity of a given token, the full coalition of candidates is needed for that.
To realize such tokens we need quite special functions.
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The most fundamental concept in public-key cryptography is that of a one-way
function. The term is very intuitive: it is easy to go in one direction (compute f(x)),
but practically impossible to go to the other direction (compute f−1(x)). Analogously,
we can dene a zero-way function as a function where both directions are infeasible,
unless some trapdoor information is available.
Denition. A set F= ffi j i2Ig is a family of zero-way functions, if there is an
injective one-way function g such that
(1) both fi(x) and fi
−1(x) can be computed in probabilistic polynomial time on input
(i; x).
(2) neither fi(x) nor fi
−1(x) can be computed in probabilistic polynomial time on
input (g(i); x).
(3) no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can verify whether fi(x)=y, when
x; y and g(i) are given.
Thus, one can commit to a zero-way function fi by revealing the element g(i). By
condition 2 of the denition this does not enable us to compute or to invert fi. For
this purpose we need the index i.
One illustrative example of a one-way function is a telephone directory. We can also
use it to describe the properties of a zero-way function. Namely, the function which
maps a phone number to the succeeding number in the directory can clearly not be
computed or inverted without browsing through all the pages of the book. Unless, of
course, one has access to a reversed directory.
In the following we are interested only in zero-way permutations.
It seems plausible to conjecture that zero-way permutations exist if trapdoor permu-
tations exist. For instance, if f=f1 f−12 where f1 and f2 are trapdoor permutations
over the same set X , then computing either of the functions f and f−1 requires to
invert either f1 or f2. There are also other methods to obtain zero-way permutations
which are more appropriate to our needs. Here we use a permutation that was also used
by David Chaum in [4], where both computing and inverting the permutation without
the trapdoor requires to compute a discrete logarithm. The advantage of this method
is that several parties may establish their own zero-way permutations operating on a
common domain.
Let p be a prime and let g be a generator of Zp . Assume that a party P has
chosen an element s2Zp such that gcd(s; p−1)=1, and P has published the element
t= gs (modp). Consider now the function
f :Zp ! Zp; f(x)= x s (modp):
Then f is a permutation of Zp . Clearly, the knowledge of s enables P to compute
both f and f−1. However, if P keeps s secret, nobody else can compute the values, or
even verify whether f(x)=y for given elements x and y, unless she=he can calculate
the discrete logarithm of t.
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In our protocol the eligibility tokens are dened through a sequence of zero-way
permutations. The voters should be convinced that their token is of required form but,
on the other hand, they should not be able to transfer this condence to anyone. The
situation calls for zero-knowledge proofs. Below we give a zero-knowledge protocol
(rst given in [4]), to prove that f(x)=y, where f is the function dened above.
Protocol 1.
P and V repeat the protocol k times.
(1) V randomly chooses two elements i and j, and computes m1 = xi  gj (modp): V
gives m1 to P.
(2) P chooses a random element l, computes m2 =m1  gl (modp) and m3 =f(m2): P
gives V the pair (m2; m3).
(3) V gives P the pair (i; j).
(4) If m1 = xi  gj (modp) then P gives l to V .
(5) If m2 6= m1  gl (modp) or m3 6= yi  tj+l (modp) then V rejects.
Lemma 1. The protocol above is zero-knowledge.
Proof (Completeness). If y=f(x) then m3 =f(m2)=f(x)i  f(g)j  f(g)l (modp)=
yi  tj+l (modp), and V accepts always.
(Soundness). Assume that f(x) 6= y, and denote by  the least positive integer such
that (f(x))=y.
If a cheating P is going to pass the protocol, he should be able to give V the element
yi  tj (modp), when only m1 = xi gj (modp) is given. But i and j cannot be extracted
from m1. In fact, for each possible choice of i there exists a unique j=’(i), such that
xi  g’(i) =m1 (modp). Therefore, the best strategy for P is to choose an element u
from the largest of the sets Ar = fu j 06u<p − 1; yu  t’(u) =yr  t’(r) (modp)g, and
give V the element yu  t’(u) (modp). According to the following lemma the size of
each Ar equals (p − 1)=, and thus a cheating P survives one round of the protocol
with probability 1=. The probability of surviving k rounds is then −k .
(Zero-knowledge). During the protocol V learns (whether she is honest or not) only
random pairs (x; f(x)). V can generate such pairs with equal distribution itself. The
construction of a simulator is straightforward.
Next we give the rather technical lemma that was needed to prove the soundness of
protocol 1.
Lemma 2. Let g be a generator of the cyclic group Zp; s2 S = f0; 1; : : : ; p − 2g
and t= gs (modp). Assume that x; y; c2Zp and denote by ’ : S ! S the function
dened by xi  g’(i) = c (modp). Denote also by  the least positive integer such that
(x s)=y (modp) and by Ar the set fu2 S jyu  t’(u) =yr  t’(r)g for each r 2 S. Then
(a)  divides p− 1.
(b) yu=(x s)u (modp) i u= i for some integer i.
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(c) yu  t’(u) =yv  t’(v) (modp) i yu−v=(x s)u−v (modp).
(d) For all r 2 S; Ar = fd+ i j i=0; 1; : : : ; (p− 1=)− 1g for some element d 2 S.
Proof. (a) Let d=A  + B  (p− 1), where d= gcd(; p− 1). Then clearly
(x s)d=((x s))A  ((x s)p−1)B=(y)A=yA+B(p−1) =yd (modp):
From the minimality of  it follows that d=  and hence  divides p− 1.
(b) Assume that yu=(x s)u (mod p). It can be shown similarly as above that yd=
(x s)d (modp), where d= gcd(u; ). Thus, d=  and u= i for some i. The other
direction is obvious.
(c) Assume that yu  t’(u) =yv  t’(v) (modp). Then we have
yu−v= t’(v)−’(u) = (g’(v)−’(u))s=(xu−v)s=(x s)u−v (modp);
where the second last equation follows from the properties of ’ : xu  g’(u) =
xv  g’(v) (modp). Similarly, if yu−v=(x s)u−v (modp), we have
yu  t’(u) = (yu−v  t’(u)−’(v))  yv  t’(v) =yv  t’(v) (modp);
since
yu−v  t’(u)−’(v) = (x s)u−v  (gs)’(u)−’(v) = (xu  g’(u))s  (xv  g’(v))−s
= 1 (modp):
(d) From part (c) it follows that u; v2Ar for some r, i yu−v=(x s)u−v (modp), and
by part (b) this is equivalent to the condition u − v= i for some i. Trivially r 2Ar ,
and because  divides p− 1, the size of each Ar is exactly (p− 1)=. If we denote by
d the smallest non-negative element r− i, then we have Ar = fd+ i j i=0; 1; : : : ; (p−
1=)− 1g. This completes the proof.
Our next protocol is the most time-consuming subprotocol used in the voting scheme.
In protocol 1 it was proved in zero-knowledge that x and y satisfy the relation f(x)=y.
Now, we want to generalize this and to prove in zero-knowledge that two lists x1; : : : ; xt
and y1; : : : ; yt correspond to each other by the relations f(xi)=y(i); (i=1; : : : ; t) where
 is some permutation of f1; : : : ; tg. What makes this task a little bit dicult is the fact
that the permutation  is not to be revealed. (Otherwise, a direct reduction to protocol 1
is available.)
Protocol 2.
P and V repeat the protocol k times.
(1) P chooses random numbers u1; : : : ; ut and computes the values v(i) =yif(u(i))
where ;  are permutations chosen also by P. P gives both lists of ui’s and vi’s
to V and keeps the permutations secret.
(2) V returns a challenge bit b.
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(3) If b=0 then P shows how the three lists of ui’s, vi’s and yi’s correspond to each
other (i.e. reveals the permutations  and  to V ) and proves by protocol 1 that
f(u(i))= v(i)y−1i :
If b=1 then P shows how the lists of ui’s, vi’s and xi’s correspond to each other
and proves by protocol 1 that
f(xiu(i))= v(i):
(4) If the execution of protocol 1 is successful, then V accepts, otherwise V rejects.
Lemma 3. The protocol 2 is zero-knowledge.
Proof (Completeness). Let us assume that f(xi)=y(i); (i=1; : : : ; t). Clearly, V ac-
cepts in the case b=0. If b=1 then, by step 1 and our assumption, v(i) =
y(i)f(u(i))=f(xi)f(u(i))=f(xiu(i)) and V accepts.
(Soundness). If a cheating P can pass the challenge b=0 then the lists of ui’s and vi’s
must correspond to yi’s and each other in the way described by the equations of step 3.
If he can also pass the challenge b=1 then the f(xi)’s must be yi’s in some order,
and hence, P is not cheating after all. Altogether, a cheating P has only a probability
of one half to pass one round.
(Zero-knowledge). In the case b=0 no information about the list of xi’s is given. On
the other hand, in the case b=1 no information about the list of yi’s is given. We
skip the construction of the simulator.
4. Technical details
In this section we discuss each phase of the voting protocol in detail.
4.1. Preliminary phase
All candidates Cj agree on a large prime p and a generator g of Zp . Then each Cj




j and commits to them by making the numbers
gs
(e)
j (modp) public. The product s(e) = s(e)1 : : : s
(e)
n (modp− 1) is now the secret key




(Here, e=1; 2; 3.) Furthermore, a list of checking numbers x1; : : : ; xt (modp) is chosen
at random and publicly. Now, each candidate Cj in turn generates a list of numbers
x1; j ; : : : ; xt; j and proves in zero-knowledge by protocol 2 of the previous section that
these numbers are exactly the numbers x
s(1)j
1; j−1; : : : ; x
s(1)j
t; j−1 (modp) in some permuted or-
der. (We assume that xi;0 = xi.) Finally, the last candidate Cn outputs numbers yi= xi; n
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(i=1; : : : ; t) and, thus, these are exactly the numbers f(1)(xi) in some order which is
not known by anybody if at least one of the candidates keeps her secret. The number
yi is allocated to the voter Vi for the next phase.
In addition to the actions above each candidate Cj chooses another secret number
rj and makes grj (modp) public. The number gr1 : : : g rn = gr1++rn (modp) serves as
the public key of this particular voting in ElGamal cryptosystem. The choice of this
encryption function E is independent of the other constructions, hence also other cryp-
tosystems may be used.
4.2. Registration phase
In this phase each voter registers herself in some oce, where she is physically
identied. There she has access to a computer and private lines to each candidate. The
voter goes through a certain protocol with each candidate, after which she is able to
compute her actual eligibility token (to be cast in the voting phase inside the vote).
The idea is that the voter can never prove to anyone (not even to the candidates)
which token she has obtained.
Let us denote the published elements of Cj by t
(e)
j = g
s(e)j with e=1; 2; 3. Denote
the permutations of Cj by f
(e)
j . Hence, f
(e)
j (x)= x
s(e)j (modp). If yi is the element
given to the voter Vi in the preliminary phase, then the actual eligibility token of Vi
is zi=f(3)(f(2)(yi)), where f(e) is the permutation f
(e)
n     f(e)1 . The function f(e)
has the candidates’ zero-way permutations as components and f(e) itself is a zero-way
permutation whose \trapdoor" (s(e)1 ; : : : ; s
(e)
n ) is shared between the candidates. Only the
full coalition of Ci’s can compute f(e).
The voter Vi begins by choosing a zero-way permutation gi similarly as the can-
didates did in the previous phase. She also commits to it. In the next step the voter
calculates the value y0i = gi(yi) and proves this equation in zero-knowledge by proto-
col 1. The candidates verify the proof collectively. In the next step candidates compute
collectively the value y00i =f
(2)(y0i)=f
(2)(gi(yi)). Once again, each candidate com-
putes successively her own share and proves it in zero-knowledge to others (and to
the voter). So far all steps of the registration phase have been public.
Now begins the private part of the phase where the voter communicates to each
candidate via private channels. The voter Vi can compute f(3)(y00i ) by asking rst for
f(3)1 (y
00






i )) from C2 and so on (using the private lines).
Finally, she gets f(3)(y00i ) from Cn. The candidates give Vi the values she asks for,
and also a zero-knowledge proof of the correctness (protocol 1). In the last step of the
registration phase Vi computes privately the value zi= g−1i (f
(3)(y00i )) which is the eligi-
bility token needed in the voting phase. By commutativity of the zero-way permutations
in use it follows that zi=f(3)(f(2)(yi)). Because of the zero-knowledge property Vi
learns the value of zi, but she cannot later prove that zi really is the element she claims.
But, there is one problem. The last candidate Cn knows which element she gave to
Vi. That element alone is not useful but if Vi deliberately reveals the trapdoor of the
zero-way function gi to Cn then Cn can compute zi. This is not acceptable. We have
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to modify the idea slightly. Assume that Vi needs to learn f
(e)
j (x) for some element
x. She can choose a random number (a mask) k and ask Cj to give her the element
v=f(e)j (x  gk). When Cj gives her this element (and a zero knowledge proof of it),
Vi can then privately compute f
(e)
j (x)= v  t j−k . There is no way for Cj to learn this
value. Also, there is no way how the voter could prove the value of k to Cj. Clearly,
this modication can be used in the interaction with all candidates and not only with
the last one Cn. Of course, there might be a conspiracy of several candidates in the
end of the computation chain and the mask should be used as a default in conversation
with every candidate.
As a summary, in the registration phase the voter Vi computes her eligibility token
zi=f(3)(f(2)(yi)), where yi is the element she was given in the preliminary phase. Vi
is given only a zero-knowledge proof of the correctness of zi, and can thus not transfer
this condence to anyone. Moreover, the computations are done in such a way that no
proper subset of the candidates can learn anything.
4.3. Voting phase
Each voter Vi computes a list of numbers i1; : : : ; iu where u is the number of
possible voting strategies (e.g. u= n). Moreover, ik = zi if Vi chooses the kth voting
strategy and ik is random otherwise. Then, Vi encrypts the list by the ElGamal en-
cryption function of the voting. Thus, the vote of Vi is vi=E(i1; : : : ; iu). This is sent
to a public le F . If the vote does not appear in the le, Vi simply sends it again. No
checking of identities of the senders is in use. On the contrary, some false votes are
even preferred. If, however, the sender is traced, this does not give any information
about the voting strategy of the sender.
4.4. Counting phase
After the deadline of the voting the candidates rst decrypt items of the public le
F and reject such lists that contain any -numbers which appear more than once in F .
Then for each voting strategy all tokens z0 associated to it are collected in to one list. It
is clear that at this stage valid tokens cannot be distinguished from invalid numbers. The
protocol 2 of the previous section is used once again and each candidate manipulates
the list by \stripping o" her share of each zero-way permutation, i.e. elements of the
list are raised to the power of (s(e)j )
−1 (modp− 1) and, simultaneously, their order is
permuted.
The commutativity of the zero-way permutations allows the candidates to execute
the computation of inverse functions in any order. To eliminate the situation in which
some intermediate value from the earlier phases appears again the inverse function
(f(1))−1 is computed rst and, respectively, the inverse function (f(3))−1 last.
The nal list contains numbers of the form (f(3))−1((f(2))−1((f(1))−1(z0))) and
these are compared with the list of checking numbers xi. Every match counts one unit
in the tally of the voting strategy in question. As already explained, there is a signicant
dierence in the order of exponentiations between the computation of zi’s given xi’s and
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the reverse computation of xi’s given zi’s (possibly scrambled with random numbers).
This guarantees that there are no matches in the various intermediate data and, thus,
proving voting strategies by \forecasting" such matches is impossible.
5. Some remarks
In this section we explain why we need to use several zero-way permutations instead
of only one f. In other words, we describe those attack types that prevent us from
using the simple scheme given in Section 2.
First, the zero-way permutation used in the preliminary phase, i.e. f(1), must be
dierent from the one used in the registration phase in order to exclude matches in
intermediate data as explained at the end of the previous section.
Secondly, the zero-way permutation used in the registration phase must be split into
three permutations, i.e. gi, f(2) and f(3), because of the following reasons.
The voter-specic zero-way permutation gi guarantees that no voter can achieve an
eligibility token of some other voter instead of her own eligibility token. In the private
conversations used to compute the function f(3) each candidate Cj computes the f
(3)
j -
image of one element that is given to Cj by the voter. There are no means for the
candidate to check that the element given by the voter is the one it should be if the
protocol is followed correctly. If the permutation gi is not used then any voter Vk
could enter the f(3)-computation with her own yk replaced by yi that belongs to the
voter Vi.
The permutation f(2) is needed for the same reason as gi. The fact that f
(2)
j is used
in the public part of the registration phase gives some guarantees for the candidate Cj.
Let us take a more detailed look at this matter. All computations in our scheme up to
the secret part of the registration phase, i.e. f(3)-computation, are proved publicly in
zero-knowledge. If at least one candidate is honest then the only elements that have
passed the f(2)-computation are the numbers f(2)(gi(yi)). This is because the honest
candidate, say Ch, executes no f
(2)
h -computations outside the correct protocol. If the
voter Vi keeps the trapdoor for gi secret then no other voter Vk can obtain her eligibility
token zi.
The only type of fraud still possible is the following. The voter Vi wants to give
Vk the opportunity to obtain zi instead of zk . This is done simply by revealing the
trapdoor of gi to Vk . Then Vk can enter the f(3)-computation with y00i =f
(2)(gi(yi))
instead of y00k =f
(2)(gk(yk)). Thus, Vk can still cast a vote, although with a wrong
eligibility token, and at the same time, Vk can be sure that Vi abstains in this voting.
However, since the voter Vk cannot do a similar deal with any other voter, the benet
of the fraud is marginal.
If the encryption function E and the one-way permutations f(e) commute it is possi-
ble to exclude also this fraud. Namely, if the double use of -tokens becomes apparent
rst time in the end of the counting phase (this happens if the decryption is not ex-
ecuted rst) then nobody can deduce which eligibility tokens were used twice. Then
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the voter Vk above cannot be sure if Vi used his token anyway (in which case both
votes are rejected).
6. Complexity
There are lots of modular exponentiations in the protocol. Fortunately, the most ex-
pensive computations are done in the preliminary and counting phases where candidates
may use powerful computers and parallel processing. Also, the time is not too critical
in these phases. In particular, the computation of yi’s from xi’s takes n executions
of the protocol 2 with a large number of data items. The results of big elections are
traditionally counted in relatively small electoral districts, hence these districts could
be treated as separate votings in our protocol. This means the number of voters might
be of the order t=104. If the number of candidates is, e.g. n=10, a rough estimate of
the cost of the preliminary phase is approximately 108 modular exponentiations, most
of which can be done in parallel. Because the time is least critical in this phase this
amount is quite tolerable.
The cost of the registration phase is about 103 exponentiations per voter per voting.
This might be the bottleneck of the protocol, since the number of voters is large. On
the other hand, the voter has also access to powerful machinery in this phase and the
whole process can be divided to a long period of time.
The voting phase is executed by less powerful remote machines but the amount of
computation needed is minimal (because it is hardly conceivable that there are very
many votings on the same hour, for instance).
The cost of the counting phase is comparable to that of the preliminary phase, hence
it is tolerable although the time is more critical in the nal phase when everybody is
waiting for the results.
Altogether, our protocol is eective in any reasonable setting.
7. Conclusions
We have shown how to arrange computer elections in such a way that there are no
trusted parties, correctness of the results may be checked by anyone and still selling
of votes is impossible. The contribution of this paper compared to [8] is signicantly
better in eciency. Our protocol is practical while the protocol of [8] is not. Since
there exists a lot of hardware for modular exponentiation our scheme can easily be
implemented.
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